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Abstract 
This paper investigates the “Phillips curve”, a controversial topic in macroeconomics. Many economists claim 
the Phillips curve is unreliable; recent evidence suggests economists should reconsider the Phillips curve. In 
particular, this paper investigates a modified Phillips curve, broadly consistent with the 1958 paper by Phillips: it 
includes import prices as an important influence on inflation. Analysis begins with UK data, as a case study: 
three Figures are shown, with a discussion on effects of OPEC global oil prices-rises in 1970s. This paper reports 
regression evidence, for nine countries, which support the idea that the Phillips curve is clearer if we control for 
import prices.  
Keywords: Phillips curve, OPEC, import prices, unemployment, inflation 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates possible links between unemployment and inflation (there are many other possible 
influences on inflation; this paper does not investigate all of them). Links between inflation and unemployment 
have been studied by many economists; an influential example is the “Phillips curve” (Phillips, 1958). Akerlof 
(cited in Mankiw & Reis, 2010, p. 3) stated “Probably the single most important macroeconomic relationship is 
the Phillips curve”. Many universities teach the Phillips curve “Today, in mainstream textbooks, the Phillips 
curve—or, equivalently, the aggregate supply relation—is the key connection between real and nominal 
variables” (Mankiw & Reis, 2010, p. 3). Marsilli (2017, p. 73) claimed “good results on the recent recovery 
period obtained using time-varying specifications, suggest that augmented Phillips curve model is still of 
particular use for inflation tracking”.   
Economic analysis reported in this paper shows that the Phillips curve is more complicated than some economics 
textbooks suggest. Some analysts claim the Phillips curve is vertical; others claim it is horizontal; and others 
claim it forms “loops” (Sloman et al., 2015, pp. 597-618). Some writers suggest the Phillips curve is the worst 
kind of economic analysis: a form of “data mining”, in which an economist notices an apparent correlation 
between unemployment and wage inflation, and turns this into a hypothesis (Hetzel, 2013, p. 86). 
The Phillips curve is often associated with Keynesian or New Keynesian economics (Mankiw & Reis, 2002, p. 
1295), associated with policy advice to governments. Many non-Keynesian economists have used the Phillips 
curve to criticise Keynesians, claiming that government attempts to reduce unemployment is futile: 
unemployment cannot be reduced below equilibrium in the long term, and a government using fiscal and/or 
monetary stimulus may cause inflation—which can only be solved when a subsequent government imposes 
“shock therapy”, to reduce inflation. 
This literature review gives an overview of various questions related to the “Phillips curve” hypothesis. This 
paper does not address all aspects of the Phillips curve, which would require many books; Forder (2014) gives 
many insights. Despite continuing criticism, the Phillips curve—and related ideas, such as the “new Keynesian 
Phillips curve”—is widely used in theoretical analysis of monetary policy (Mankiw & Reis, 2002, p. 1295). This 
paper adds to the debate on whether or not the Phillips curve is academically respectable, in the early 21st 
century. 
2. Literature Review 
In this paper, the “Phillips curve hypothesis” refers to the claim that inflation and wage rises tend to be higher, 
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when unemployment is lower. Phillips curve analysis is usually based on a figure with wage-rises or inflation on 
the vertical axis, and unemployment on the horizontal axis—as in Figure 2 below. Phillips (1958) shows several 
charts, each suggesting a downward-sloping line: steeper on the left, and flatter on the right. 
Many writers express concern about a lack of precision, when discussing the Phillips curve. Forder (2014, p. 8) 
wrote “Another important point concerns the numerous ways the expression ‘Phillips curve’ is used. There is not 
even consistency as to whether it is a relation of wage change or price change to unemployment”. Mankiw and 
Taylor (2017, p. 343) wrote “it should be noted that Phillips examined inflation in nominal wages rather than 
inflation in prices, but for our purposes that distinction is not important”; other economists disagree, claiming 
that the exact specification makes a big difference to research (Mavroeidis et al., 2014, p. 172). 
One controversy is who should receive the credit—or blame—for the Phillips curve. There is widespread 
agreement that Phillips (1958) is an important paper in economics. But several writers claim a negative 
relationship between inflation and unemployment known before Phillips (1958): for example, the basic idea was 
suggested by Hume in 1752; and empirical evidence was reported by Fischer in 1926; Tinbergen in 1937; Brown 
in 1955; Klein and Goldberger in 1955; Clark in 1957; Sultan in 1957 (Bildirici & Özaksoy, 2016, p. 368; Forder, 
2014, pp. 11-12). It has been suggested that Lipsey, in 1960, was the true source of “Phillips curve literature” 
(Forder, 2014, p. 16). 
The point where the Phillips curve crosses the horizontal axis (where wages neither rise or fall) is sometimes 
called the “natural rate of unemployment” by New Classical and Monetarist economists; this is considered the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment—but because of market imperfections and frictions, Keynesians often prefer 
to call it the “non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment” (NAIRU) (Sloman et al., 2015, pp. 597, 604). 
2.1 What Causality Does the “Phillips Curve” Claim? 
A central issue in Phillips curve debates is causality: if there is a relationship between unemployment and 
inflation, which is the cause and which the effect? Diagrams in Phillips (1958) show unemployment on the 
horizontal axis, and wage-rises on the vertical axis; this suggests unemployment is a cause of falling wages. 
Most economists who accept the Phillips curve appear to imply that wages tend to fall if unemployment is high, 
or rise if unemployment is low. For example, Milton Friedman claimed unemployment causes wages to fall, 
rather than falling wages causing unemployment (Forder, 2014, p. 9). But Schwarzer (2012, p. 994) claimed 
Phillips had a different interpretation of causality “whereas for Phillips changes in the rate of unemployment 
induced changes in wages and prices, for economists like Friedman ... unperceived changes in inflation are the 
driving force of quantity changes”. There could be a feedback process, in which unemployment affects and is 
affected by inflation. 
Conventional Phillips curve analysis considers the level of unemployment; another consideration is rate of 
change of unemployment. Phillips (1958, p. 283) wrote “in a year of rising business activity, with the demand 
for labour increasing and the percentage unemployment decreasing, employers will be bidding more vigorously 
for the services of labour than they would be in a year during which the average percentage unemployment was 
the same but the demand for labour was not increasing”. 
2.2 Is the Phillips Curve Vertical, Horizontal, or Upward-Sloping? 
Empirical evidence on the Phillips curve is inconsistent. Ormerod, Rosewell and Phelps (2013, p. 1519) claimed 
that the Phillips curve sometimes shifts. “It is likely that the factors which govern the inflation/unemployment 
trade-off are so multi-dimensional that it is hard to identify periods of short-run Phillips curves which can be 
assigned to particular historical periods with any degree of accuracy or predictability. The analysis shows that 
reliance on a trade-off between inflation and unemployment for policy purposes is misplaced even in the short 
run”. Bildirici and Turkmen (2016, p. 366) found “the USA Phillips curve is not stable”. Blanchard et al. (2015, 
p. 24) report “the slope of the Phillips curve has decreased over time in most countries. Most of the decline, 
however, took place from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s. Since then, the coefficient has remained roughly 
stable”. 
In the long run, the Phillips curve is seen by Monetarists such as Milton Friedman as being vertical (Mankiw et 
al., 2016, p. 483), “In the long run, therefore, the Phillips curve will be vertical at the rate of unemployment 
where real aggregate demand equals real aggregate supply” (Sloman et al., 2015, p. 604). Nevertheless, many 
non-Keynesians accept the idea of a short-run Phillips curve sloping downwards. 
There is some evidence that the UK Phillips curve may have become almost horizontal in recent years (Sloman 
et al., 2015, p. 606). Marsilli (2017, p. 65) wrote “there is a consensus on the economic literature about the 
instability of Phillips Curve over time and its flattening since the 1980’s”. This may be due to inflation targeting, 
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by central banks and/or by governments: many central banks (such as the Bank of England, ECB, and USA 
Federal Reserve) are instructed by governmental agencies to keep inflation close to a particular target (Sloman et 
al., 2015, p. 600)—often 2% inflation per year. If so, and if central banks are able to keep inflation close to the 
target, we might expect to see little vertical variation in the Phillips curve for the foreseeable future.   
We could interpret the Phillips curve as a thermometer, to tell us the state of an economy. If we are at the 
lower-right-hand corner of the Phillips curve, the economy appears to be in recession or slump; whereas the 
top-left-corner of the Phillips curve suggests a growth or boom period. Even if we use wage rises on the vertical 
axis (rather than inflation measured by a Consumer Price Index), there are more than two possibilities: an 
economy could be in recession, but experience wage-rises in response to external forces such as OPEC oil-price 
rise—a pattern sometimes called “stagflation”. Sloman et al. (2015, p. 605) wrote “In the 1970s, many countries 
experienced ‘stagflation’—a simultaneous rise in unemployment and inflation”. This suggests there may be 
periods when the Phillips curve slopes upward—a topic discussed below. This appears to be incompatible with 
the Phillips curve hypothesis. 
2.3 Are There Loops in the Phillips Curve? 
The idea of “loops” in the Phillips curve was mentioned by Phillips (1958). The existence of loops may be 
related to “hysteresis”, which refers to “the lagging or persistence of an effect, even when the initial cause has 
been removed” Sloman et al. (2015, p. 598). A related explanation for loops is delayed effects—Phillips (1958, 
pp. 297-298) found the loops in data he studied could be resolved by using unemployment data lagged by 7 
months. 
If there are loops, they may be explained by the “expectations-augmented Phillips curve”, associated with Milton 
Friedman (Sloman et al., 2015, p. 602), shown here as equation 1. 
π = f(1/U) + πc + k                                   (1) 
In “adaptive expectations”, people expect inflation in the near future to be similar to recent inflation rates. Some 
economists claim Phillips, rather than Friedman, deserves credit for the concept of adaptive expectations 
(Sloman et al., 2015, p. 602; Schwarzer, 201, p. 995). In this non-Keynesian approach, expectations about 
inflation are important, “The higher inflation is expected to be, the higher it will be” (Sloman et al., 2015, p. 601). 
This can lead to the Phillips curve shifting vertically upwards over time: if inflation rises, people come to expect 
inflation to remain high, hence explaining clockwise loops in the Phillips curve. Mankiw et al. (2016, p. 487) do 
not refer to loops, but use similar analysis. 
2.4 Is There a Trade-off Between Inflation and Unemployment? 
Another question is how to interpret the “Phillips curve”. Charts in Phillips (1958) may be claimed to imply a 
trade-off between unemployment and inflation. However, perhaps most of the influential research on this idea of 
a trade-off occurred long after Phillips’ paper was published in 1958. Forder (2014, p. 1) wrote “Phillips (1958) 
discovered a negative relation between inflation and unemployment; then, either under the influence of 
Samuelson and Solow (1960) or otherwise, policymakers treated it as offering a selection of 
inflation-unemployment combinations from which they could choose”. Hetzel (2013, p. 88), referring to the 
global oil-price-rise period in the 1970s, wrote “At the heart of the activist policy pursued during the Great 
Inflation was the belief in an ‘exploitable’ Phillips curve, that is, a Phillips curve allowing the policymaker to 
trade off between the achievement of unemployment and inflation objectives”. 
If the Phillips curve is interpreted as a “menu of choices”, a government can choose economic policy to reduce 
inflation, or reduce unemployment, but cannot achieve both simultaneously (Forder, 2014, p. 34)—a view 
apparently accepted, but later rejected, by the UK Labour government (Maloney, 2011). Norman Lamont (the 
Conservative UK Chancellor of the Exchequer) said “Rising unemployment and the recession have been the 
price that we have had to pay to get inflation down. That price is well worth paying” (Hansard, 1991). 
Bildirici and Özaksoy (2016, p. 368) discuss monetary policies by governments and central banks, claiming the 
Phillips curve “implies a fundamentally empirical relation between labor markets and monetary policy”. Other 
economists disagree: Hetzel (2013, p. 89) claimed the “common understanding of the nature of the Phillips curve 
and activist policy rested on two basic assumptions. First, inflation is a nonmonetary phenomenon. That is, 
inflation springs from a variety of real factors rather than from the failure of the central bank to control money 
creation”. Keynesians suggests a government can use “demand management” to reduce unemployment, by 
increasing government spending (fiscal policy).  
The Phillips curve appeared to shift in the decades after Phillips (1958) was published; this offered even greater 
hope for Keynesian economists, “It is easy to see how the idea could appear to be to shift the Phillips curve with 
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incomes policy and simultaneously move round it with demand policy” (Forder, 2014, p. 147). Such optimism 
seemed unjustified when “stagflation” occurred in the 1970s: the Phillips curve appeared to promise that we 
cannot have high inflation and high unemployment, but both were higher than expected (in UK and USA, for 
example). Stagflation can be seen in Figure 2 below, perhaps most clearly in 1975 and 1980-1981.   
Bildirici and Turkmen (2016, pp. 361-362) discuss the “New Classical” Phillips curve, and the “New 
Monetarist” Phillips curve; both claim there is an inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment, but 
only in the short run. Such non-Keynesian economists use the Phillips curve to criticise government attempts to 
control the economy: such control attempts, they suggest, cannot succeed. Inflationist policy was pursued in 
some countries, until Phelps and Friedman pointed out in 1967-1968 that continuous inflation changes 
expectations and shifts the Phillips curve, so there is no long-run trade-off, “although this was initially disputed, 
in due course it was accepted” (Forder, 2014, p. 1). This is part of the “accelerationist theory of inflation” 
(Sloman et al., 2015, p. 603, 606; Forder, 2014, p. 14), in which the Phillips curve is used to argue against 
Keynesian government intervention such as demand management. 
2.5 Do Import Prices Influence the Phillips Curve? 
Perhaps the Phillips curve hypothesis can be improved by including an additional influence on inflation. Phillips 
(1958, pp. 298-299) considered cost-push and demand-pull inflation, and investigated import prices, “Import 
prices rose very rapidly during 1950 and 1951 as a result of the devaluation of sterling in September 1949 and 
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. In consequence the retail price index rose rapidly during 1951 and 
1952”. Schwarzer (2012, p. 986) wrote “Wage changes in Phillips’ analysis are driven by export and import 
prices, cost of living adjustments … and by the demand for labour”, suggesting a simple chart of inflation 
against unemployment is oversimplified. In general, “the rate of change of money wage rates can be explained 
by the level of unemployment and the rate of change of unemployment, except in or immediately after those 
years in which there is a sufficiently rapid rise in import prices to offset the tendency for increasing productivity 
to reduce the cost of living” (Phillips, 1958, p. 299). Marsilli (2017, p. 66) analysed effects of oil prices on 
inflation, and claimed “inflation is buffeted by many other supply factors. In this respect, energy related 
variables are particularly suitable to track price evolution”. 
2.6 Can We Rely on the Phillips Curve? 
Economists disagree about many things; but debates on the Phillips curve are especially heated, because they are 
central to policy recommendations given by many economists. We can interpret the Phillips curve as a 
thermometer: if we are at the top-left end of the Phillips curve, the economy may be “overheating” (at the peak 
of the business cycle, where excess demand raises wages and prices). Alternatively, an economy at the 
bottom-right end of the Phillips curve may be in recession. The Phillips curve (especially versions including 
expectations) can also be predictive, “Despite its instability over time and across countries ... the Phillips curve 
offers a reliable framework for forecasting purposes” (Marsilli, 2017, p. 64). 
Economists who support Keynesian “demand management” (active fiscal policy, to smooth out the business 
cycle) might use the Phillips curve to inform the government when and how to act: whether to raise or cut 
government spending this month. For example, several UK governments accepted that there is a trade-off 
between inflation and growth; this “was interpreted as a choice between operating at the bottom of the curve—a 
‘preserve the pound’ strategy that looked attractive to Tories—versus operating at the top of the Phillips 
curve—a ‘go for growth’ strategy more attractive to Labour” (Bollard, 2011, pp. 7-8). 
Neoclassical and Monetarist economists see the Phillips curve very differently. Many non-Keynesian economists 
accept there is a downward-sloping short-term Phillips curve, but claim the long-term Phillips curve is vertical 
(Sloman et al., 2015, pp. 602-606). If a government used Keynesian “demand management” to reduce 
unemployment, Sloman et al. (2015, pp. 604-605) state “The implication for government policy is that 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy can reduce unemployment below Un only in the short run. In the long 
run, the effect will be purely inflationary” (Un is the “natural rate of unemployment”). 
This paper does not attempt to offer a definitive answer on Phillips curve controversies discussed above, but 
seeks to improve understanding by focusing on an important but often-neglected confounding variable: import 
prices. In particular, it builds on previous research such as Marsilli (2017), that global oil prices are relevant to 
the Phillips curve. Mankiw et al. (2016, p. 488) wrote “Friedman and Phelps had suggested in 1968 that changes 
in expected inflation shift the short-term Phillips curve, and the experience of the early 1970s convinced most 
economists that Friedman and Phelps were right. Within a few years, however, the economics profession would 
turn its attention to a different source of shifts in the short-term Phillips curve: shocks to aggregate supply … A 
large increase in the world price of oil”. This paper widens the topic from OPEC oil price-rises in particular, to 
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import prices in general, as a possible explanation of the apparent upward shift in the Phillips curve in 1970s 
(shown in Figure 2). 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section explains the data used, and the number of 
countries and years examined. Then, regression methods are outlined: a simple Phillips curve model, followed 
by the same model with the addition of import prices. The following section reports findings, beginning with 
figures for UK (a case study), and then regression results. The concluding section attempts to reconcile diverse 
findings on the Phillips curve, and suggests directions for future research. 
3. Data and Methods 
Marsilli (2017, p. 64) discusses the Gordon “triangle” methodology, which typically relies on three elements 
(sometimes lagged): inflation, unemployment rate, and a supply shock variable. This paper uses a similar 
approach: the “shock” variable in this paper is import prices, which is associated in some years with global 
oil-price rises. Hence, this paper follows Phillips (1958) by including a measure of import prices. All data used in 
this paper are annual. 
Inflation data are from the World Bank “World Development Indicators” database; it might be preferable to use 
wage inflation, as a more accurate reflection of Phillips (1958); but they are not reported by World Bank (2017). 
Consumer Price Index data are available from World Bank (2017, series FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG), but data do not start 
until 1989 for UK (the case study). UK figures in this paper focus on the 1970s, when OPEC prices rises led to 
higher inflation, “the period from the mid-1960s through the end of the 1970s (the Great Inflation) is important 
in that the characterization of monetary policy—the economists’ proxy for an experiment—was unusually clear” 
(Hetzel, 2013, p. 83). Hence, this paper uses “Inflation, GDP deflator (annual percentage increase)” from World 
Bank (2007, series NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG). Unemployment data used here are “Unemployment, total (% of 
total labor force) (national estimate)” from World Bank (2017, series SL.UEM.TOTL.NE.ZS). Data availability 
is more complete for UK than ILO estimates of unemployment (World Bank, 2007, series SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS). 
Data on import prices are “Import Price Index, All Commodities” from IMF (2017). This index is set to 100 in a 
reference year (which varies between countries). The author attempted to study all countries, for all available 
years, for the selected variables. To produce reliable regression results, a country is excluded if the effective 
sample is below 40 years; hence, most countries are removed due to missing data, leaving nine countries in 
Tables 1 and 2. All nine countries have data from 1975 to 2015; a few countries have more data (the earliest data 
used is for 1962, and the latest for 2016). For UK, in Figure 3, the real annual GDP growth-rate is calculated 
from “GDP (constant LCU)” (World Bank, 2017, series NY.GDP.MKTP.KN). 
Marsilli (2017, p. 68) compared four empirical models: 
 augmented Phillips curve, where oil price variable is daily sampled within MIDAS weighting scheme 
 Augmented Phillips curve, with monthly oil price supply shock variable 
 Phillips curve model that only includes both unemployment gap and lagged inflation 
 Autoregressive model 
This paper uses some aspects of Marsilli’s approach: it includes import prices (intended to control for oil 
price-rises, as well as other import price shocks), as a possible influence on inflation; uses ARIMA regression to 
take account of auto-regression in the data; and uses lagged data in regressions. The author carried out 
Auto-Correlation Function (ACF) analysis of data used, and found very strong first-order autocorrelation in 
inflation and unemployment. Hence, ARIMA (1, 1, 0) regression analysis is used, with the following 
specification: 
π = a + b[AR(1)] + d Log(U) + ξ                           (2) 
In equation 2, π represents annual inflation; [AR(1)] is a first-order autoregressive term, calculated by SPSS; U is 
unemployment (percent); and ξ is a random error term. The Log of unemployment is widely used by researchers 
such as Phillips (1958, p. 290)—it helps to reduce errors associated with the curved (rather than straight) nature 
of the Phillips curve. Terms a, b and d are constants, estimated by the ARIMA command in SPSS. Results using 
the above regression are reported in Table 1 below. A different regression specification, used for Table 2 below, is 
shown in equation 3: 
π = a + b[AR(1)] + cM-1 + d Log(U) + ξ                        (3) 
Equation 3 uses the same terms as equation 2, with the addition of M-1 which is an index of import prices, lagged 
by 1 year. Unemployment is not lagged (in equations 2 and 3): Phillips (1958, p. 298) used a lag of 1 year for 
import prices, but a lag of 7 months for unemployment. This paper, using annual data, can only lag by 1 year or 
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use unlagged data. Using lagged import prices, but non-lagged unemployment, can be justified by the horizontal 
lines in Table 1 of Phillips (1958, p. 298), and his subsequent comment “From Table 1 we see that in 1948 the 
cost push element was considerably greater than the demand pull element, as a result of the lagged effect on 
retail prices of the rapid rise in import prices during the previous year”. 
This paper does not attempt a “definitive” test of the Phillips curve: economists referred to in this paper use 
many different regression methods, and “seemingly innocuous specification changes lead to big differences in 
point estimates” (Mavroeidis et al., 2014, p. 172). The two regression specifications in this paper have a simple 
aim: do we find a clearer Phillips curve relationship, if (in Table 2) we add import prices to the regression? 
4. Results 
Empirical evidence begins with three figures, using UK as a case-study. Figure 1 shows annual percentage rises 
in inflation and import prices. Import price rose in 1974 and 1980; both years were associated with global oil 
price rises (not shown in Figure 1). At around the same times (1975 and 1980), there were fairly large rises in 
inflation (shown by the GDP deflator). The exact timing of these price-rises is not clear in Figure 1, due to use of 
annual data; but Figure 1 is consistent with the sequence of events from rising global oil-prices, to rising import 
costs for UK, and to rising inflation in UK. This suggests that the two big OPEC oil-price rises in 1970s were 
causes of high UK inflation in 1975 and 1980. 
 
Figure 1. Growth in GDP deflator and import prices, for UK 
 
The next empirical evidence is Figure 2, which shows evidence the Phillips curve for UK: for selected points, the 
year is identified. A key question is whether or not there are “loops” in Figure 2. The most persuasive loop is 
from 1972 to 1978; another loop occurs from 1978 to about 1983. After 1983, the existence of loops is less 
persuasive; if there is doubt about the 1972-1978 and 1978-1983 loops, we might reject the idea of loops in the 
Phillips curve. 
Figure 2 shows dashed lines from 1974 to 1975, and from 1979 to 1980 (years of large global oil-price rises); 
both show an upward slope, implying rising prices and rising unemployment—apparently rejecting the Phillips 
curve hypothesis. But in Figure 1, 1974-1975 and 1979-1980 are special cases, presumably caused by OPEC 
price-rises. Without these two loops, the case for the existence of clockwise loops in the UK Phillips curve seems 
unconvincing (the period 1981-1988 looks like a loop, but is anti-clockwise: this is incompatible with 
explanations of loops explained in the literature review). 
Focusing on the two dashed line-segments in Figure 2 (1974-1975 and 1979-1980), we can explain increased 
inflation in terms of rising import prices (using Figure 1). But why do these two dashed line-segments also show 
rising unemployment? Figure 3 may explain why: there are noticeable periods of negative growth around 1974 
and 1980: periods of recession, which are associated with high unemployment. It is possible that the two large 
oil price-rises in the 1970s caused high inflation and caused recession/high unemployment. In summary, Figures 
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1 to 3 are consistent with the hypothesis that “loops” in Figure 2 are artefacts of the data: oil price-rises caused 
inflation, and also raised unemployment—hence taking the UK economy upwards and to the right in Figure 2, 
which can be mistaken for part of a “loop”. 
 
Figure 2. Possible loops in the Phillips curve, 1972 to 2015, for UK 
 
The preceding discussion, based on UK as a case study, suggests several lessons. The theory attempting to 
explain “loops” in the Phillips curve—discussed in the literature review—may be incorrect. Figure 2 is far from 
a smooth downward-sloping line (as the Phillips curve is often drawn in textbooks). There may be one or more 
“confounding” variables, which shifted the Phillips curve vertically: if so, the periods 1974-1975 and 1979-1980 
may help us identify a confounding variable, because they were years when the UK behaved least like the 
Phillips curve predicts. The UK cases study suggests OPEC oil prices-rises may be a helpful explanation of 
apparent loops. 
However, a convincing case requires more evidence than these three Figures. Regression is the standard 
technique in economics, as Marsilli (2017) carried out using oil prices. This paper now turns to ARIMA 
time-series regression, explained in the “Data and methods” section; but uses an index of import prices (for each 
country), rather than oil prices in particular. 
 
Figure 3. Inflation and GDP growth, 1972 to 2016, UK 
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Regression results in Table 1 (based on equation 2) show a simple test of the Phillips curve, in which the 
dependent variable is inflation, and the independent variable is Log of unemployment. Focusing on the 
right-hand column, most unemployment coefficients are negative, consistent with the Phillips curve; but two 
countries (Denmark and South Korea) have positive coefficients—implying an upward-sloping curve, 
incompatible with the Phillips curve hypothesis. These results offer little encouragement to economists building 
their analysis on a version of the Phillips curve (as many economists do—see literature review). Figures 1 to 3 in 
this paper may suggest a possible improvement: if we control for import costs, there is less risk of OPEC 
oil-price rises in 1970s distorting evidence on the Phillips curve. Many other variables could be added to 
regressions (such as global interest-rates, or a dummy variable to control for the global financial crisis around 
2008), but they are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Table 1. ARIMA regression results, not including import prices 
Country AR(1) constant Log of unemployment 
Austria -0.38 *** -0.02 
 
-4.05 ** 
Denmark -0.32 ** -0.28 
 
1.74 
 
Finland -0.20 
 
0.08 
 
-11.77 *** 
Greece -0.12 
 
-0.22 
 
-13.86 ** 
Japan -0.46 *** 0.07 
 
-27.39 ** 
Korea, South -0.12 
 
-0.27 
 
0.11 
 
Sweden -0.43 *** 0.05 
 
-9.96 *** 
United Kingdom -0.11 
 
-0.14 
 
-6.52 
 
United States 0.03 
 
-0.01 
 
-3.30 
 
 
Table 2 is based on equation 3, which adds an import price index: this may be better than oil prices used by 
Marsilli (2017), if other international “shocks” have similar effects as oil price-rises have. By controlling for 
import prices, Table 2 may be more reliable than Table 1. For this paper, the key point is that Table 2 has a 
negative unemployment coefficient (implying a downward-sloping Phillips curve) for all nine countries: the 
unemployment coefficients in Denmark and South Korea (positive in Table 1) are negative in Table 2. In addition, 
the number of statistically significant coefficients or unemployment has risen from 5 countries (in Table 1) to 6 
countries (in Table 2). In Tables 1 and 2, * indicates statistically significant at 10%; ** indicates statistically 
significant at 5%; and *** indicates statistically significant at 1%.   
 
Table 2: ARIMA regression results, including import prices 
Country AR(1) constant 
import prices 
(lagged by 1 year) 
Log of 
unemployment 
Austria -0.41 *** -0.02 
 
0.04 
 
-3.79 ** 
Denmark -0.59 *** -0.23 * 0.11 ** -0.54 
 
Finland -0.24 
 
0.08 
 
0.03 
 
-11.22 *** 
Greece 0.02 
 
-0.21 
 
-0.05 
 
-16.60 *** 
Japan -0.46 *** 0.15 
 
0.01 
 
-29.66 ** 
Korea, South -0.19 
 
-0.48 
 
0.04 
 
-1.40 
 
Sweden -0.69 *** 0.03 
 
0.16 ** -8.69 *** 
United Kingdom -0.25 * -0.09 
 
0.19 ** -9.80 
 
United States -0.23 
 
-0.01 
 
0.08 ** -4.55 ** 
 
This paper does not attempt to offer a definitive test of the Phillips curve hypothesis: for example, recent 
empirical research (see literature review) often considers expected inflation. Future research could improve the 
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above regression results, by adding more variables: a possible candidate is money supply—central to the 
Quantity Theory of Money—because some countries (such as Zimbabwe) have been accused of causing inflation 
by printing excessive amounts of banknotes. Increasing the sample-size would be desirable; this might be 
achieved by using other data sources (for example, using quarterly data). 
Mavroeidis et al. (2014, pp. 172-183) argue against making small changes in regression specifications for the 
Phillips curve, “Issues related to the choice of explanatory variables, instruments, alternate data constructions, 
and small modifications of the model are likely to be dwarfed by identification problems. Instead, we think it 
will be more fruitful to explore fundamentally new sources of identification, such as micro/sectoral data, 
cross-country models, information from elasticity of intertemporal substitution in large datasets, and stability 
restrictions. Some recent papers have taken up this challenge, and we hope more will follow”. This paper is 
innovative, in using data on nine countries to test a claim (made by several authors discussed in the literature 
review, including Phillips himself) that we can understand the Phillips curve better if we treat import prices as a 
confounding variable. In the Phillips curve, import prices are too important to ignore—especially in the 1970s, 
when OPEC changed the rules of the game. 
5. Conclusions 
The Phillips curve is important in contemporary economics. Pedrosa and Farhi (2015, pp. 239-240) claim the 
Phillips curve is one of three equations which are central to New Keynesian economics (the others are an 
aggregate demand equation, in which output depends on expected future output and real interest rate; and a 
“Taylor rule”, identifying the interest rate to keep inflation on target). The Phillips curve is also used by “New 
Classical” and “New Monetarist” economists (Bildirici & Turkmen, 2016). 
This paper discusses some controversial aspects of the Phillips curve. There were thought to be “loops” in the 
Phillips curve; this paper suggests apparent loops in 1970s and 1980s are “artefacts of the data” (during global 
economic downturns caused by OPEC oil price-rises in 1970s, several events occurred simultaneously: 
increasing cost-push inflation; and recession which led to increased unemployment). 
Robust evidence requires persistent relationships, “The discipline of looking at the entire set of historical 
experiences rather than isolating individual episodes favorable to one hypothesis … reveals whether real 
instability arises in contexts of monetary stability as well as in contexts of extreme monetary instability” (Hetzel, 
2013, pp. 86-87). By using data from all available years and all available countries, this paper provides some 
reassurance that the Phillips curve can be relied on. However, there is considerably more data available from 
sources such as World Bank (2017), if different variables are used—or if countries with less than 40 years’ data 
are included. 
Evidence in this paper suggests economists are justified in continuing to use the Phillips curve, to interpret the 
state of an economy. It can be argued that the Phillips curve needs more research. New insights will help 
economists make sense of the relationship between unemployment and wage-rises, by controlling for other 
influences such as import prices.   
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